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Abstract  
This article explores the reception of human rights norms on child labour in Bolivia and 
Argentina, countries where governments and civil societies express support for human rights. 
Yet national responses after ratification of International Labor Organization’s conventions 
diverge significantly. In Bolivia domestic interpretations of human rights have prevailed over 
attachment to ILO conventions (‘deviant compliance’) while in Argentina national policies 
exceed ILO recommendations (‘over-compliance’). We use the evidence presented here to 
call for a more nuanced understanding of what compliance with human rights principles is 
understood to mean and to stress the importance of domestic interpretations of international 
norms.  
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International human rights agreements have proliferated since the 1990s. 1  They seek to 
encourage states to behave in ways that respect human rights and they play a major role in 
shaping ideas about how world politics should be conducted. Indeed, the influence of human 
rights agreements is now such that it is even felt in the domestic politics of non-democracies.2 
But despite their proliferation, we still have an incomplete understanding of how states 
respond to internationally agreed charters of rights, why they respond how they do, the 
circumstances under which rights treaties make a difference and what that difference might 
be. Simmons3 and others4 argue that attention should be paid to national-level politics in 
explaining state responses. Legal changes after ratification are more likely to occur when key 
domestic actors, whether from within the state or civil society or a mix of both, recognise the 
value of the international norm and pressurize for rights-based policies.  
Compliance tends to be understood in this debate in an either/or fashion: state either 
come into line with international human rights law or not.  As Chayes and Chayes put it, the 
question is whether there is “observance (or not) of treaty commitments by the parties”.5 This 
understanding prevails not only in international law scholarship but also in international 
relations.6 Legal anthropology and constructivist approaches to international relations sought 
to document the ‘translation’ or ‘socialization’ of human rights that shapes domestic 
compliance,7 by which they mean how international norms become attached to local issues 
that allow communities to ‘make sense’ of the norm; but they have not challenged the 
assumption that ‘compliance’ implies an alignment between domestic practices and 
international agreements. Yet, in fact, treaty compliance and compliance with human rights 
principles are not necessarily identical. Treaties and agreements offer an interpretation of the 
underlying rights principles. There might be widespread acceptance of that interpretation; but 
equally, it is also possible to agree with the rights principle that inspired the norm, but not 
accept the way it has been codified. Indeed, it is also possible to hold the view that the 
international norm is too weak or does not go far enough.  
What happens when governments accept the underlying rights principle associated 
with an international rights norm but disagree with its codification? Will they take steps to 
implement the international agreement or will they promote an alternative interpretation of 
the underlying rights principle that is thought to more adequately reflect domestic views? If 
governments choose the latter, we argue this can be understood as a form of ‘deviant 
compliance’, providing that there is a genuine engagement with internationally accepted 
human rights principles. Equally, governments might accept the rightness of both the 
international agreement and the underlying principles with such enthusiasm that their 
response goes significantly beyond that required under international law. We term this ‘over-
compliance’ 8 . Both deviant and over-compliance are different from the expected shape 
compliance is traditionally thought to take, that is the close alignment of domestic law and 
practices with international norms. In fact, this traditional mode of compliance might more 
accurately be described as ‘responsive compliance’ since it implies a responsive reform of 
domestic practices following the ratification of international rights agreements.  
We discuss the phenomenon of deviant and over-compliance here in relation to a set 
of international norms that seek to exclude children and young people from the labor market 
until they reach a certain age, usually 14, and protect them from hazardous work. We draw on 
two examples from Latin America, Bolivia and Argentina. In both countries, international 
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child labor norms and children’s rights are taken seriously and there is acceptance of the 
rightness of human rights as a guiding principle of policy-making. Yet, in Bolivia, a national 
debate about children’s rights and child labor led to a new law in 2014 that legalizes children 
working from the age of ten in some circumstances such as self-employment. There can be 
little doubt that Bolivian legislation is in contravention of International Labor Organization 
(ILO) policy, specifically Convention 138 (C.138) on the minimum age for work; 
nevertheless, the government and key civil society actors insist that the law is designed to 
protect child workers and uphold their rights. It is, in other words, a form of ‘deviant 
compliance’. Argentina, meanwhile, not only seeks to uphold C.138 but has gone 
significantly beyond what is required to be legally compliant with ILO Convention 182 
(C.182) on exploitative and inappropriate child labor, introducing legislation that punishes 
those who employ children with up to four years of prison. This, we argue, is an example of 
‘over-compliance’. The explanation for these responses lies in the structure of national 
politics and, in particular, domestic human rights politics. We thus follow Simmons 2009 and 
Grugel and Peruzzotti9 in stressing the importance of domestic politics for compliance, but, at 
the same time, we pay closer attention than they do to the spectrum of what compliance itself 
can be said to entail and emphasize the importance of domestic interpretations of human 
rights discourses for explaining compliance outcomes.   
 
Cases and Methods 
 
Why Child Labor? 
 
Child labor is an important window into debates about compliance with human rights. On the 
one hand, the issue is becoming more salient in global politics thanks in part to pressures 
from international organizations (in particular the ILO and the United Nations Children's 
Fund, UNICEF) and non-governmental organizations such as Save the Children, Terre des 
Hommes, Defence of Children International. The elimination of child labor has been included 
as a target within the new Sustainable Development Goals, which has replaced the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2015 as the new global development roadmap. 
On the other hand, child labor brings together two issue-areas where there are growing 
pressures for the adoption of global rights-based standards: childhood and labor. Yet, perhaps 
surprisingly, child labor has been framed in terms of human rights only relatively recently. 
The study of child labor has been dominated in disciplinary terms mainly by economists, who 
tend to link it with particular household economies, capitalist and non-capitalist, and global 
chains of production,10 along with anthropological and sociological perspectives, which have 
sought instead to show how child work is culturally embedded and forms part of family 
practices of social reproduction.11 There are surprisingly few studies of child labor from a 
human rights perspective.12 The domestic politics of compliance in relation to child labor 
thus represents new terrain for human rights researchers. At the same time, it is gradually 
becoming clear to international policy makers that there are domestic dynamics to 
compliance with international child labor agreements which raise important questions for 
how they can pursue their own agenda:   
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National and regional approaches are very important. In the end, it should be determined by 
the countries what particular responses they should put forward to face the problems that 
they experience. These problems are quite different and depend, for instance, on the types 
of child labor, the quality of the education and child protection system, or the strength of 
national governments.13 
 
Understanding domestic debates around child labor is thus crucial both for academic debate 
and for global policy.    
 The ILO is at the forefront of attempts to reframe child labor from a human rights 
perspective.14 The organization has opposed child labor since its foundation in 1919 and set 
out minimum age for work in 1973 (C.138), but it was not until the 1990s that there was a 
decision to undertake a major push on child labor and, at the same time, a human rights focus 
crept into its work. In 1992, the ILO set up the International Programme on the Elimination 
of Child Labor (IPEC) to target certain states and offer both resources and pressure to reduce 
the numbers of working children. In 1998 the effective elimination of child labor was set out 
as one of the ILO’s four ‘fundamental principles’. C.182 came shortly after in 1999, 
specifically focusing on the elimination of the ‘worst forms’ of child labor, and was rapidly 
ratified. In 2002 an annual World Day against Child Labor was set up as a major ILO 
campaign, and ratifications of C.138 on the minimum age, which had been slow, eventually 
gathered pace. A new stage in ILO activity began in 2010 that explicitly linked the 
eradication of child labor to children’s rights, leading to the international agreement (known 
as the Hague Roadmap) in the same year, signed by 97 countries, to eliminate the worst 
forms of child labor by 2016.15 This was followed by the Brasilia Declaration in 2013, which 
was a joint initiative of the ILO, governments and international Non Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs), to encourage states to take action on C.182.  
Whilst C.182 is an independent agreement, referring specifically and only to the worst 
forms of child labor, it is, in fact, closely bound up with the ILO’s push against all forms of 
child labor – and understood as such within the ILO itself and in countries targeted for action. 
This link is often highlighted in ILO documents including its guide to C.182: 
 
The basis of such action [to eliminate child labor] must be legislation, which keeps 
the total elimination of child labor as the ultimate goal of policy, but which explicitly 
identifies and prohibits the worst forms of child labor to be eliminated as a matter of 
priority.16  
 
This means that national policies in response to C.182 often deal with the issue of 
child labor more widely; pressure to implement C.182 has, in effect, opened up a broader 
discussion of whether children should work at all and whether work in any form is an 
intrinsic violation of their rights. In fact, while the idea that children have distinctive age-
related human rights is accepted by most states (as set out in the widely ratified United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, UNCRC, 1989), the view that children’s 
rights are best protected by the elimination of child labor is more contentious.17 Labor and 
production practices are profoundly shaped by deep, place-based traditions of production and 
social reproduction, which mean that children in many parts of the world contribute 
significantly to family income.18 As such, child labor often takes place in cultural contexts 
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that do not consider it as necessarily bad for children. It was almost inevitable, therefore, that 
the ILO decision to incorporate the elimination of child labor as one of its fundamental 
principles (1998) was bound to be controversial in countries where child labor is profoundly 
embedded in household economies and local culture.19  
Yet despite the fact that the nexus between human rights and child labor is 
contentious terrain, there are as yet few detailed studies on domestic policy responses to ILO 
agreements in contexts where significant numbers of children work, whether formally or 
informally. Logically, given the social embeddness and economic significance of children’s 
work for many households and families in the global South, what compliance with 
international rights agreements comes to mean here will yield some important insights into 
both the social construction of compliance itself and the domestic politics that underpins 
different national approaches.  
 
Why Bolivia and Argentina?  
 
Latin America is increasingly recognized as a ‘right-respecting’ region.20 The ratification of 
human rights conventions played an important role in the region’s international rehabilitation 
in the 1990s and acted as a support mechanism for democratization.21 Despite a ‘Latin bias’ 
in the Anglo-American media with regards to rights violations,22 Latin America has actually 
made a significant contribution to the creation of international human rights norms. 23 
Furthermore, over the last decade the region has gone through a process of political and 
social transformation, with the electoral victory of leftist governments in most of South 
American countries (what has been called the ‘pink wave’ or the ‘left turn’) and the 
introduction of a so-called ‘postneoliberal’ economic model. Postneoliberalism marked the 
‘return of the state’ in Latin American economies, in particular through a wave of social 
protection policies targeted at vulnerable populations and a stronger regulatory agenda in a 
range of sectors, including labor, environment and health. 24  Governments and social 
movements in the region have begun to speak of economic and social rights, as well as 
classic liberal rights25, and have shown a willingness to frame independent approaches to 
rights questions.26 
Both Argentina and Bolivia joined the ‘left turn’ that swept the region in the early-
mid 2000s, with the electoral victory of popular coalitions led respectively by the Peronista 
Nestor Kirchner and by the coca-growers union leader Evo Morales27. However, as with all 
‘interruptions’ to neoliberalism 28 in Latin America, new left governance is nationally 
distinctive. In Bolivia, given the organizational strength of the indigenous and peasant 
movements, policies have been shaped by discourses that reject both neoliberalism and 
colonialism and emphasize the possibilities of more pluralistic and autochthonous forms of 
governance (at the core of the new 2009 Constitution and the model of plurinational state)29. 
In Argentina, in contrast, post-neoliberalism was associated above all, with a resurgence of 
trade union claims, workers’ rights, the creation of employment and a new ‘decent work’ 
agenda. 30  The Argentine state, moreover, resumed its traditional dominance over civil 
society. 31  The two countries are also significantly different in terms of their levels of 
economic development32, although both have undergone a process of in-depth social reforms 
and strengthened the role of the state in the economy.  
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 Methodologically, focusing on these two cases allows us to compare different post-
ratification compliance politics in the framework of relatively similar macro-political and 
economic processes that are also part of a common regional trend. We have sought to 
eliminate the possibility that the complex domestic politics of compliance with regard to 
child labor could simply be attributed to hostility or opposition to international human rights 
agreements – though they may play a part – so we can zoom in on the detail of domestic 
differences in interpretation of the rights obligations of states in two cases where 
governments express commitments to human rights principles in general. To be clear, then, 
we are not comparing compliance disputes between countries where one or both are hostile to 
the idea of rights-based policy-making; rather we are consciously trying to uncover what lies 
beneath cases where the importance of rights is acknowledged but where there is nonetheless 
considerable divergence from international norms in terms of compliance outcomes.  
 Qualitative research is particularly good for examining socially constructed meanings 
in context. As such, the research relies on intensive fieldwork in both Bolivia and Argentina 
between July 2013 and September 2014. Fifty-four people (twenty-two in Bolivia and thirty-
two in Argentina) were interviewed, including representatives of national and international 
organizations (Ministries, Ombudsman officers, Members of Parliament MPs, public 
attorneys, representatives of ILO, UNICEF, United Nations Development Programme 
UNDP, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights OHCHR), civil 
society organizations (CSOs, including children movements and national and international 
NGOs), trade unions and the private sector. In Bolivia, the research took place during the 
heated national debate that would lead to Law 548 (also called Children’s and Adolescents’ 
Code) and we were able to complement one-to-one interviews with participant observations 
at workshops organized for and by working children’s organizations, and meetings between 
civil society groups and state authorities to discuss the reform. In Argentina, the differences 
with Bolivia were discussed at a seminar that included policymakers and social actors as well 
as academics, organized at the University of Palermo. An analysis of a range of relevant 
documentation was also carried out for both cases, including government, international 
organizations and civil society reports, internal policy documents, campaign and outreach 
materials. These documents were useful to complement information obtained through 
interviews and particularly to gather information on official statements, internal discussions 
and discourse and communication strategies of different actors. In 2015, further interviews 
were conducted at the ILO and UNICEF headquarters in Geneva and New York with nine 
international officers working on child labor, some of whom spoke to us on condition of 
anonymity.  
 
On the Politics of Compliance 
 
For many years, research on international human rights agreements was inspired principally 
by international law or international relations. 33  Such scholarship provided convincing 
explanations on why states chose to ratify human rights agreements, but not on what 
happened after ratification. The importance of post-ratification politics for explaining the 
meaning of ratification was first highlighted by scholars of civil society, social movements 
and advocacy politics, who emphasized the key role of globalization as a resource for 
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domestic activists.34 This led to research that explored the ways in which domestic civil 
society actors engaged with global rights agreements inside the national state after 
ratification. 35  But as Cardenas 36  points out, outcomes from domestic debates about the 
meaning of post-ratification compliance are shaped not only by civil society but also by the 
state and the resources it can deploy. Beth Simmons37 also pays attention to the state, as well 
as civil society, in what is the most complete review of why domestic politics matters for 
human rights compliance. Simmons argues that pro-rights reform can occur if the executive 
strongly backs reforms inspired by international law or in cases where the courts or 
parliaments press for new legislation, as well as when there is domestic civil society 
mobilization.  
There is agreement, then, that the domestic level matters. As Hillebrecht recently 
noted: “understanding compliance with human rights law requires delving into the 
relationship amongst domestic political actors and a parsing out of their motivations, 
capacities and institutional strengths”38. In their discussions of children’s rights in Latin 
America, Grugel and Peruzzotti39 describe the coming together of groups of state and non-
state actors to press for the adoption of particular policies post-ratifications as ‘compliance 
coalitions’. They emphasise the fluidity of such coalitions and the way their make-up shapes 
how the agenda of compliance is understood. But compliance coalitions also shape broader 
discussions of human rights. And whilst initially research emphasized the role of civil society 
above all in compliance, there is an increasing awareness of the role of governments in 
actively shaping post-ratification compliance debates.  
Domestic responses to the ratification of international rights are shaped not only by 
the resources civil society and states bring to the debate but also by competing ideas, interests 
and interpretations about what being compliant means. As Grugel and Peruzzotti40 argue, the 
politics of compliance is not “simply about whether a particular set of human rights claims 
are seen domestically as legitimate (…). [It] can also involve a conflict of interpretation over 
what treaty obligations mean; how to translate rights principles into domestic law, policy and 
practice; and what issues should be prioritized for reform”. There is not, in other words, one 
single route to compliance or one unique set of policy responses that should be understood as 
being rights-compliant; different outcomes after ratification might reflect different 
interpretations of what rights actually mean. This room for manoeuvre around what 
compliance means reflects the fact that international rights agreements set out shared 
principles but do not always provide a single roadmap on how to achieve them. Additionally 
the actions proposed by international rights agreements do not always resonate in domestic 
settings.  
In practice, compliance politics entails something more than the inclusion of 
international treaties in domestic laws or the respect and monitoring of human rights. 
Compliance can acquire quite different meanings depending on how states and domestic 
actors interpret human rights and the moral principles that underpin them. We understand 
compliance as the process of reform of national legislation and policy frameworks to adhere 
to certain rights principles shaped by international human rights norms and reinterpreted 
through a domestic process of ‘translation’ and socio-political negotiation. As such, we take a 
somewhat less rigid than traditional definition of compliance (Chayes and Chayes 1993, 
Simmons 2009) and allows for broader variation in the interpretation of rights principles. In 
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fact, although compliance has been generally understood as the alignment of domestic laws 
and policies with international agreements, in practice it is possible to be sympathetic to the 
general principles underlying a rights treaty and, at the same time, differ substantially on how 
the rights that underpin international law should be interpreted. When this happens, we argue 
that, the concept of compliance should not be dismissed a priori; there is first a need to 
explore whether the state in question is reinterpreting the norm in ways that ‘make sense’ 
locally and searching for ways to ensure that their citizens benefit from rights protection. We 
also recognize that compliance is, in practice, a process; however, we wish to zoom in here 
on the initial legal response, which is the first step to broader change. We draw from 
Simmons (2009) argument about the sincerity of ratification to note that states may seek 
‘sincerely’ to comply, even when implementation practices are patchy and problematic. As 
such, from an operational perspective our definition limits the empirical focus on legal and 
policy instruments, leaving aside the evaluation of the effectiveness of legal measures and 
policy implementation. 
 
Bolivia: Deviant Compliance and the Limited Legalization of Child Work 
 
Child labour in Bolivia has recently been the object of considerable international attention 
following the approval, in July 2014, of a new Children’s and Adolescents’ Code (Law 548). 
The Code recognizes child labor as exceptional but nonetheless it allows children to work 
from ten years of age for self-employed children and twelve for children who work for 
others, if authorized by the Child Ombudsman Office. The Code was accompanied by 
promises from the government to increase monitoring so as to eliminate the exploitation of 
children in the workplace and forced child labor. Nevertheless, despite these steps to ensure 
that children’s rights in the workplace would be upheld, several NGOs, including Human 
Rights Watch (HRW) and Anti-Slavery International (ASI), have condemned the new 
Code.41 The policy has also been denounced by the ILO’s Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations as a violation of the Minimum Age 
Convention (C.138), urging the government to amend the law42. Indeed it is hard to deny that 
the Code represents a deviation from strict compliance with ILO agreements. But the 
Bolivian response, we argue, is not the result of the country’s unwillingness to comply with 
the Convention, but reflects rather an alternative interpretation of children’s rights and best 
interests.  
Child labor is a both a visible and significant phenomenon in Bolivia. According to 
the last National Labor Survey, more than 28 per cent of Bolivian children and young people 
between the ages of five and seventeen – almost 850,000 – take part in some kind of 
economic activities.43 In line with international statistics, levels of participation are much 
higher in rural areas (65 per cent) and the majority of children are employed in the agriculture 
sector (50,2 per cent) or sell on the streets (21 per cent). Only a few of them work as 
labourers (13,7 per cent) and even less (13 per cent) are qualified workers. The scale and 
pervasiveness of child labor have undoubtedly contributed to the domestic politicization of 
the issue. But, added to this, is the fact that the domestic debate about child labor has taken 
place against a backdrop of intense national debate about the nature of citizenship itself and 
Bolivia’s place within the global political economy. This had shaped the interpretations of 
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Bolivia’s obligations with regard to ILO conventions, within both civil society and the state, 
in a very distinctive way.  
Bolivia’s first Children’s and Adolescents’ Code had been promulgated in 1999, in 
response to ratification of the UNCRC. Ratification of the minimum age Convention, C.138, 
has taken place just two years earlier, in 1997, but had no major impact on domestic policy. 
The Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labor, C.182, was ratified in 2003, and was 
followed by the introduction of a national plan to eradicate child labor, supported by the ILO. 
But its impact was minimal. The debate about child labor that opened up around 2008 was 
sparked by a combination of heightened ILO pressures, especially in relation to exploitative 
or hazardous labor, and the Constitutional reform process in particular. The new Constitution 
approved in 2009 created a plurinational state that expressly set out to combine liberal 
democracy with collective rights and local, indigenous autonomies. 44  Working children 
associations (Niños Niñas Adolecentes Trabajadores, NATs) had mobilized as part of the 
social movements’ activities around the new Constitution and were already organized, 
therefore, in 2010 when the discussions opened to reform the 1999 Children’s Code and 
review the National Plan to eradicate child labor.   
The domestic debate, which did not close until Congress passed the new Law in 2014, 
was extraordinarily intense and conflictual. Tensions, which were sometimes framed around 
the place and interpretation of international rights law in national politics, took the form of a 
discussion as to how best to protect and promote children’s rights. On the one side, were 
ranged civil society groups who tried to press the government to introduce eradicationist 
legislation, followed by new programmes of action to reduce child work and an enforcement 
of the minimum age. On the other side, were a second group of civil society movements, 
again supported by some government officials and, crucially, the Union of Bolivian Working 
Children and Adolescents (UNATSBO), who favoured the introduction of legislation that 
would uphold the rights of child workers and offer them protection through regularization of 
their status. Both camps claimed to have the wellbeing of child workers at heart.  
The first group favoured strict adherence to ILO norms, arguing that “it makes no 
sense to create protective conditions when child labour is banned”.45 This view was widely 
shared by key political actors in the governing party and in Congress: 
 
It is pointless to legalize child labor, because the result would be to create a state policy based 
on the belief that the new generation of men and women are trained in schools, in the family 
and at work, and this is not the vision of a society that we want to build. Also it has been 
proved that children who work do not receive a proper education.46  
 
The second group, meanwhile, pushed for an interpretation of children’s rights that meant 
stretching those norms in ways that could fit a domestic political economy where young 
people’s work was both valued and recognized as essential to family survival. This was 
important: there were strong feelings that any reform that would proclaim the eradication of 
child labor as its goal would underline not only children’s rights but also the traditional 
family-based economy. As working children told us during a workshop in Cochabamba:  
 
The ILO has policies on labor but they work more internationally. What we would like more is 
a national organization that reflects the politics of Bolivia because we have our own national 
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reality. We don’t live in the same world as other countries (…). [Therefore] We don’t want 
labour eradication. We want it to be valued since at the end we are contributing to the 
country.47  
 
An interesting feature of the debate in Bolivia was that it was not a simple conflict 
between the state and civil society. Wide differences opened up within civil society and 
indeed, within the government itself. The pro-ILO/eradicationist party was led by the 
Ministry of Labor, which was close to the ILO, plus a number of local and international 
NGOs; while the pro-legalization movement included the NATs, along with NGOs such as 
Save the Children, Defence of Children International and some branches of Terre des 
Hommes, and donors such as the Italian Development Cooperation Agency. This second 
group also enjoyed the sympathy of governmental representatives in Congress and civil 
servants in the Ministry of Education and the Ombudsman Office.48 It was the second, pro-
legalization coalition that triumphed in the end, due as much to its resources as to the fact that 
the arguments it was making resonated with the broader political process that Bolivia is 
undergoing. UNATSBO was well-connected to the Constitutional Assembly (2006-2009) and 
highly effective at mobilizing to get its voice heard.  
 
Children representatives went to Sucre [where the Constitutional Assembly was meeting], 
marched and presented their proposal, which was initially included but then erased in the 
final text. So they mobilized again, this time in Oruro. They stayed until they [the Assembly 
delegates] listened to them and they managed to agree the article directly with the President 
of the Assembly. This is one of the important achievements of the working children 
themselves, as a result of this negotiation.49  
 
Although the ILO-sponsored group was well-funded and counted on a slick 
communication strategy, it was unable to access either the presidency or the governing party 
to the same extent than the legalizationist group. The latter also benefitted from the very 
marginal engagement of Bolivian unions in this discussion, thus removing one of the 
traditionally vocal actors against child labor from the debate.  
Throughout the six-year long debate, each side accused the other of putting ideology 
over the needs and rights of children. But, perhaps surprisingly, references to right-based 
arguments were deployed by the pro-legalization lobby more often and consistently than by 
eradicationist supporters, as a way of consciously countering the view that ILO conventions 
were inevitably the best way to protect Bolivian children. Work, they argued, should be 
recognized as a right for children and adolescents; the presence of children in the labour force 
should not always be seen as a serious social problem. Echoing a Declaration of the 
International Working Children Movement, which explicitly mentions work as an “important 
human right” and central for children’s personal development,50 UNATSBO’s proposal for 
the new Code states that:  
 
Working children and adolescents are primarily human rights subjects (...) the State is 
obliged to protect those rights, including the right to work and to participate in public life 
with their own opinion and participation; in short, addressing the regulation of child labour 
within a framework of human rights protection could imply a much more comprehensive 
framework of obligations’ compliance and exercise of rights.51  
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The pro-ILO lobby, meanwhile, seemed to avoid invoking international rights 
discourses directly, perhaps in order to avoid a backlash against what might be seen as 
international imposition. As a result, few direct references were made to children’s human 
rights and there was a reliance instead on evidence and arguments about the side effects of 
child labor, for example on children health and education.  
A peak in the pro-legalization mobilization was reached in December 2013 when a 
group of working children demonstrated in La Paz in favour of their rights to work and were 
dispersed by police violence. The Office of the Presidency openly criticised the repression 
and President Evo Morales met with NATs’ leaders, and finally made public his own position 
on child labor. 52  An ex-child worker himself, Morales grow up in a rural indigenous 
community of the Bolivian highlands. His sympathies were undoubtedly with working 
children. Moreover, Morales’ leadership relies on his ability to articulate demands from 
traditionally excluded social sectors and his willingness to offer a radically different approach 
to Bolivian politics, historically dominated by economic elites and old oligarchies. In this 
context, the claims of the NATs about the inappropriateness of an eradicationist approach for 
Bolivian multicultural society and the reflection of a western ideal of childhood resonated 
with a broader critique of colonialism and domestic scepticism vis-a-vis liberal global 
governance. During a press conference in December 2013, President Morales went on record 
saying that: “child labor shouldn’t be eradicated; yet children should not be exploited or 
forced to work. Some work out of necessity. To eliminate children and adolescents’ work is 
to eliminate their social conscience”. 53  Morales’ intervention may just have swung the 
debate. Six months later the new controversial Code was promulgated. 
This story of how the new Children Code was approved sheds light on the dynamic 
that led to the new, and controversial, approach on child labor in Bolivia and the different 
domestic understandings of how the state should deliver on its obligations to vulnerable 
children. These differences, as we have illustrated, did not shape up along the lines of civil 
society versus the state, with civil society demanding the introduction of policies to protect 
children or keep them out of the labor force. Rather there were voices within both civil 
society and the state in favour of the introduction of measures that would seek to eradicate 
child labor (whatever the implementation difficulties); and equally voices within civil society 
and the state that demanded that the government recognises the difficulties of eradication and 
acknowledge the right of child workers to make a contribution to the family through work. 
Yet the outcome was not only shaped by these ideational disputes but by the institutional 
resources that each side brought to the dispute. 54  In the end, capturing the ear of the 
Presidency and his closest allies in the ruling party, which had a majority in Congress, was 
crucial. In other words, the law was not the outcome of a process of negotiation and 
consensus-building, but the result of highly vocal social groups who reached a political 
settlement with the government.  
The government is resolute in its conviction that the new Code, not only is not a 
violation of children’s rights, but that it offers them protection. The Code has been presented 
as an improvement in rights terms, and the result of an inclusive process in which children 
were recognized as social actors in their own right. With the argument that the Code will 
ensure the “full and effective enjoyment of [children’s] rights” and safeguard “the interests of 
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[children], in accordance with the State Constitution and international treaties on human 
rights”, in March 2015, the Bolivian government stood firm and rejected the 
recommendations made in the framework of the Universal Periodic Review.55 This position 
was again confirmed during a meeting of the European Parliament’s Committee on 
Development to discuss the Code, where the Bolivian Ambassador stressed that: 
 
It is a law in which children are not objects for which standards are available and administrative 
procedures are established but (...) are the actors and subjects bearers of rights and duties. (...) 
With this law, the norm is adapted to fit the existing context (…), to a particular socio-cultural 
reality, while in international conventions views have been marked by a Western conception.56  
 
Argentina: Over-compliance and Criminalization   
 
In contrast to Bolivia, in Argentina the internal debates about state obligations with regard to 
child labor were considerably less acrimonious. The outcome was also remarkably different, 
with the government introducing measures that far exceeded ILO recommendations with 
respect to both the minimum age for work (C.138) and to C.182 or the elimination of all 
forms of hazardous labor. In 2008, the minimum working age was increased from fourteen to 
sixteen and a government unit to protect working adolescents was created (Law 26.390). 
Even more remarkably, Argentina criminalized the employment of children in 2013 (Article 
148bis of the Penal Code), making it punishable with up to four years in prison, the only 
exceptions being parents and guardians. A public attorney specialized in children rights 
called this “a symbolic act in itself, sending the message that this society thinks it is bad that 
children work”.57 As well as being symbolic, however, the law is intended to have teeth: 
between March 2013, when the reform was approved, and August 2014, the Ministry of 
Labor has brought 105 cases against employers of children (63.3 per cent in the trade and 
service sector and 20 per cent in rural labour), although none has yet reached a definite 
judgement.   
As with Bolivia, Argentina was governed, until December 2015 and during the period 
of reform of child labor statutes, by a nationalist party that frequently expressed independent 
views from the US and the Western mainstream. What accounts, then, for the introduction of 
policies that accept the rightness of the ILO’s opposition to child labor, but go much further 
than ILO, and which are, at the same time, markedly different from those adopted by the left 
government in Bolivia? We suggest that Argentina’s distinctive approach reflects the strength 
and cohesion of the domestic socio-political coalition against child labor, which brings 
together trade unions, public opinion and key state institutions such as the Ministry of Labor. 
The ILO kick-started a domestic debate in Argentina, as in Bolivia, but national policies are 
inspired not by ILO visions or the result of its influence over the Kirchner governments but 
by national actors and public opinion that take an even harder line than the ILO itself. The 
Director of the Committee for the Monitoring and Implementation of the International 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CASACIDIN) put it this way:  
 
Child labor is one of the few issues on which Argentinians fully agree. We cannot conceive 
ideologically of the idea that children can join trade unions and explaining that is a task in 
which unions have done very well. (...) In addition, in this country, there was no tradition of 
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children to work from a young age (...). The school culture was always very strong. There is 
no organization that promotes child labor.58  
 
This view was echoed across all interviews we held with trade union leaders and civil 
servants.59  
This consensus and Argentina’s response to child labor is rooted in the traumatic 2001 
economic crisis and the politicization of child labor that took place at that time. The rapid 
pauperization that followed the economic meltdown pushed thousands of children into the 
street in search for work in the informal sector. In 2003, the Office for the Children’s Rights 
of Buenos Aires estimated that there were between 3,500 and 4,000 children working as 
cartoneros, gathering recyclable waste on the street to be sold to recycling enterprises and 
intermediaries. 60  Initially, then, child labor came onto the policy agenda framed as an 
aberration; it was regarded as a sudden reaction to economic crisis and extreme austerity, a 
measure of how far the country had fallen. But as growth returned, it was clear that the 
cartoneros were only the most visible face of child labor. Research established that around 14 
per cent of Argentine children between five and seventeen work, most of whom also attend 
school.61 Many of these children are immigrants, especially from Bolivia and Paraguay, and 
they are employed in the service sector (78 per cent), agriculture (13 per cent) and industry (7 
per cent). 
The shock of the economic crisis and the sudden visibility of children working even 
in the most upmarket areas of the capital marked a turning point in national attitudes. Up until 
that time, little public attention had been paid to the issue. Furthermore, during the 1990s 
civil society views were divided between children’s rights advocacy groups who simply 
accepted ILO approaches, and a smaller number of vocal organizations who worked directly 
with marginalized children, such as the Chicos del Pueblo movement. These groups tended to 
articulate positions not dissimilar from social movements in Bolivia and they sought to find 
value in children’s work, recognising the contribution the children were making to family 
survival strategies.62 After the ratification of C.182, in 2001, however, and in the midst of a 
much more serious public and political engagement with children’s rights in general,63 the 
pro-legalization movements, which were previously respected amongst children’s rights 
groups, found themselves marginalized. The pro-eradication lobby mainly formed by unions, 
meanwhile, has allied with the government, which suddenly took the issue up as part of its 
post-crisis strategy, and implemented policies that go significantly beyond ILO proposals.  
 The legitimacy of both the government of Nestor Kirchner and of Cristina Fernández 
de Kirchner, in office between 2003 and 2015, rested on the image they presented as 
governments committed to the interests of the poorest in society. The eradication of child 
labor became part of a wider approach that includes the extension of child welfare benefits 
and workers’ rights. 64  Moreover, for governments that were criticized at times for their 
human rights practices,65 this was an area where the high moral ground can be claimed. As a 
result of presidential backing, the Ministry of Labor, itself traditionally a powerful 
department under Peronism and one that, moreover, had benefited from staff continuity 
because of the ten-year long Kirchner-Fernández Kirchner governments, created a National 
Commission for the Eradication of Child Labor (CONAETI) and drafted a series of five-
years National Plans (2006-2010 and 2011-2015). Other initiatives included the 
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establishment of a coordination office for child labour inspection and the introduction of the 
first survey on child labor. Government action reflects the public mood that child labor is an 
aberration in Argentina, associated above all with the 2001 crisis, and one that could be 
eradicated if swift action is taken. It is grounded in the belief that child labour and children 
rights are fundamentally incompatible:   
 
Argentina addresses the issue of child labor from a rights perspective. This is the key point: to 
understand that children have the right not to work until the age at which they are prepared 
mentally and physically to do so. Child labor (…) violates the UNCRC.66 
 
 In this case, therefore, the agency of the state has been crucial; outcomes have not 
been driven by civil society. Indeed, the NGOs sector has played a relatively marginal role in 
the fight against child labour. Only a few national organizations have really been involved, 
while international NGOs, especially those that take a pragmatic view, have not been able to 
influence the public debate – indeed Save the Children was completely marginalized and 
eventually closed its country office in 2013. Instead, the government’s response depended on 
support from its long-term ally – the trade union movement. The powerful General Workers 
Union (CGT) had, in fact, come out in favour of eradication of child labor in the mid-1990s, 
before the issue was really in the public consciousness. It had also taken a lead on the issue 
within MERCOSUR. The CGT saw itself “as a watchdog” on labor rights, and views child 
labor as an abuse of those rights. 67  In those sectors where child labor is regarded as 
significant, unions have put in place strategies to combat it. The teachers’ union (CTERA) 
has also been active in organizing awareness campaigns. The cartoneros union recently 
signed an agreement with the Buenos Aires city government to create nurseries for its 
affiliates, while the ladrilleros (brick-makers) union – where a high percentage of workers 
come from Bolivia and child labour is particularly widespread – is directly involved in the 
programme of inspections coordinated by the Ministry of Labor.68 Interestingly, business 
groups also joined the fight against child labor. In 2004, fifty-five national companies signed 
a Declaration against Child Labour calling for the prohibition of the employment of children 
below the minimum age,69 and, in 2007, the CONAETI led the formation of a Network of 
Enterprises Against Child Labour. This led to the creation of a joint public-private 
programme called Harvest Gardens (Jardines de Cosecha) to create nurseries and play 
centres for children.  
In sum, a strong, relatively efficient and determined state took the lead in articulating 
a national response that goes beyond ILO recommendations. In fact, neither the ILO nor 
national and international NGOs have played much of a role in developing national policy. 
Instead, the government has relied mainly on the union movement. But civil society is 
certainly not hostile to government actions. The pro-legalization lobby was never dominant, 
even in the 1990s, and the shock of the 2001 economic crisis led to the consolidation of a 
view in favour of the elimination of child labor. Once it was marginalized, the government 
was able to introduce a raft of policies that rested on a widespread view in the country that 
child labor was not to be tolerated and that firm action to eradicate it and the introduction of 
new welfare policies would be able to eradicate it. As such, the country has set out a sui 
generis approach that engages only tangentially with ILO recommendations – Argentina has 
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not yet set out a list of what constitutes hazardous work for children, for example, which is 
formally required by C.182 – that reflects national views that child labor is both abhorrent 
and alien to national culture.  
 
 
Comparing Divergent Compliance and Restating the Importance of Domestic Politics  
 
In both Argentina and Bolivia, children’s rights and the debate about how best to protect the 
rights of working children have, quite clearly, been taken very seriously; equally, 
governments and civil societies in both countries evidently regard the international 
conventions that govern child labor as important starting point for domestic debate. Yet in 
neither country have governments simply aligned domestic law with the international rights 
agreement. Instead, they have sought, in radically different ways, to adjust international child 
labor norms and shape them in ways that reflect domestic perceptions of children’s rights in 
relation to work. These are, then, somewhat different models of compliance.  
In Bolivia, civil society actors were dominant in domestic debates and discussions 
have been deeply acrimonious. Civil society has divided between those that support 
eradicationist approaches and those in favour of legalization. ILO activism, combined with 
the opening up of a national debate about the Constitution and how best to balance 
indigenous practices and democratic principles created a new ‘opportunity structure’ for 
action, but not one that led to a pragmatic coming-together of civil society organizations as 
described in some literatures on social movements.70 Instead, both sides were able to count 
on allies internationally and nationally. 71  This led to the coexistence of two competing 
coalitions, neither of which gave way. While both these coalitions were able to marshal 
human rights arguments to support their views, they offered quite different interpretations of 
what children’s rights mean in relation to work. The pro-eradication coalition pushed for 
reform that mirrored the text of ILO conventions (C.138 and C.182) or responsive 
compliance. The pro-legalization group, meanwhile, developed an alternative discourse and 
roadmap in which the right to work should be recognized to children as a way of ensuring 
measures of protection and avoid exploitation (and violations of other human rights). They 
argued for a form of deviant compliance – a law that was in violation of C.138 on the 
minimum age but which also set out standards and protection for children in the workplace. 
This group managed to win the argument once they caught the ear of a government that has 
consistently been willing to promote the idea of Bolivia as independent from Western 
influence.  
In Argentina, the collapse of the economy in 2001 created a receptive context for the 
government to take the lead on child labor, in the framework of a wider welfare reform. In 
this fight, the Ministry of Labor found a key ally in the trade unions sector. The unions had 
traditionally opposed child labor and, additionally they had increased their influence after the 
crisis72. Not only has Argentina taken seriously ILO compliance targets, it has also set out its 
own ambitious proposals to crack down on child labor. Quite clearly, the government has not 
been a passive recipient of international norms. Indeed, the repeated postponement of the list 
of hazardous employment for children, which is a requirement under C.182, suggests in this 
case not a government tolerant of less dangerous forms of child labor, but one that is 
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determined to eradicate all forms, and for whom the list is therefore seen as irrelevant. 
Furthermore, the recent law that criminalizes child labor exploitation does not distinguish 
between acceptable and unacceptable forms of work. Argentina is therefore a case of a over-
compliance and a government determined not simply to follow the ILO conventions but to set 
more ambitious standards for eradication.  
Understanding why and how countries comply with international human rights norms 
is a complex endeavour.73 Domestic politics is as central to the ‘how’ as to the ‘why’. In fact, 
the really interesting feature of Bolivia and Argentina’s compliance with international child 
labor agreements is not so much ‘why’ – we would expect generally rights-respecting 
democratic countries to do so – but ‘how’. Their divergent patterns of compliance, which can 
only be explained through the lens of domestic politics, draw clearly on two factors: the 
socio-political settlement combined with the institutional resources of civil society and state 
actors; and domestic perspectives on the fitness of the international agreement. But these 
domestic debates are also playing out in a broader geopolitical context that will almost 
certainly have an impact on the global reception of human rights ideas.  
 In Argentina and Bolivia, institutional resources and patterns of civil society/state 
interaction have been crucial for shaping outcomes in relation to child labor. Both countries 
have highly mobilized civil societies and active trade union movements. However, while in 
the case of Argentina major trade unions took a leadership role in consolidating an anti-child 
labour coalition (mirroring what have generally happened in Western countries and at the 
international level), in Bolivia, the unions stayed at the margins and debates were led by the 
NATs movements demanding the right to work, with the support of international NGOs and 
donors. State attitudes are also fundamental for explaining outcomes: Argentina is an 
example of how a strong leadership by state institutions, supported by the continuity of key 
administration’s managers in their positions and a relatively efficient bureaucracy, led to the 
definition of a coherent strategy, at least at the national level. This was not the case in 
Bolivia, where different state institutions and ministries have adopted conflicting and 
changing stands on child labour. This can be attributed in part to the lack of leadership within 
the state apparatus as well as to the fragmented and volatile nature of Bolivian public 
administration. It was the fact that Bolivian actors, and perhaps especially Bolivian children, 
were driving the debate that meant that the state finally took a view in support of what has 
come to be seen internally as the most appropriate strategy, but also as one that asserts the 
right of Bolivia to ‘be different’ from the international norm. Outcomes are in part the result, 
then, of the extent to which the resources of, and relationships between, governing elites and 
the coalition of actors leading the discussion within civil society articulate.  
Beyond the underlying relationships and resources of state and civil society, and the 
contingent political processes associated with them, domestic views on the fitness of 
international child labor norms were also important. The difficulties of embedding 
international human rights norms, which after all tend to codify a particular morality 
associated with the West and the European Enlightenment, in contexts that do not share the 
same cultural background are well known.74 These difficulties can be accentuated when the 
international norms set out to prescribe daily family life and familial political economies. In 
this sense, the debate on child labour is an exceptionally moral dispute, with only a limited 
degree of pragmatism. It tends to ignores the difficulty of defining what constitutes child 
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labor in much of the global South and ignore the fact that many “activities (…) fall between 
exploitation and abuse on the one hand and helping-out on the other”,75 such as part-time 
self-employment or family agriculture.76 Child labor norms are, in fact, quite different from 
the approach taken with regard to the UNCRC, which allows considerable room for national 
negotiation and where, in any case, monitoring is both weak and generally supportive of 
governments. In this case, Bolivian social movements, and ultimately the government, 
concurred with the view that international norms on child labor were inappropriate and would 
not improve the rights of children. Instead, they opted for a deviant form of compliance that 
has sought to put in place novel ways to protect child workers. Argentina, in contrast, seized 
the opportunity to present itself as a leader on human rights internationally by going far 
beyond the ILO recommendations. Only time will tell whether either deviant or over-
compliance will lead to greater rights for children than the middle way proposed by the ILO.  
Finally, distinctive Bolivian and Argentinian responses have emerged in a changing 
geopolitical context. It is certainly the case that the Latin America region is rights-respecting 
and has been an enthusiastic backer of the creation of international human rights standards. 
Nevertheless, there is a growing sense in both countries that it is time for rights standards to 
be set at the national level. This may well reflect growing resistance of new emerging powers 
and middle-income countries to Western impositions. In the 1990s, soon after the collapse of 
the Soviet block, many governments worldwide tried to model themselves on Western norms, 
in the effort to reproduce similar levels of prosperity and stability and to gain the 
benevolence, political and economic support of Europe and the United States.77 As part of 
this process, countries were willing to ratify international treaties and add human rights to 
their constitutions as a sign of their willingness to adapt to that model. Since then, fresh 
challenges to Western dominance have emerged, not just from areas previously thought of as 
the ‘global South’, but also because it has become clear that the Western model of progress 
has significant limitations and does not guarantee either economic development or social 
progress. Dissent from ILO prescriptions in both Argentina and Bolivia may well reflect a 
global context in which divergence from the Western norm is becoming more common.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Over the last decade, constructivist research in anthropology and international relations has 
shown that the way international human rights norms are ‘translated’ or adapted to local 
circumstances plays a major role in shaping compliance.78 Grugel and Peruzzotti79 reveal 
how state and non-state actors have engaged in acts of ‘translation’ in relation to children’s 
rights in Latin America, resulting in quite different national priorities for reform. But their 
evidence80 comes from governments that were keen to be associated with implementation of 
human rights agreements as a way of shoring up new or recent democracies – in relation to a 
human rights convention, the UNCRC, that allows governments to focus on some issues and 
shelve others. This meant that the advocates of rights-based reforms were generally 
responsive to international agendas for human rights implementation. They were able to 
circumvent claims that the UNCRC codified ‘inappropriate’ norms or was externally imposed 
in ways that are simply not possible in relation to the far more precise ILO-sponsored norms 
on child labour. Indeed, in relation to child labor, there is agreement that children should not 
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carry out age-inappropriate work or work that is harmful for them, but no agreement as to 
what work is harmful or what age is inappropriate for a particular task. So, whilst on the 
surface, human rights law on child labor (and particularly C.182 and C.138) seems 
reasonably straightforward and clear, in fact, it leaves considerable room for domestic 
variation.  
Child labor is therefore a good example of those norms where domestic translation 
has been particularly contested. These tensions have been explored so far through the lens of 
anthropology and economics. But they have significance for human rights scholarship as 
well. This paper shown how, even in contexts characterized by similar macro-political 
processes and with a shared concern for children’s rights, models of compliance can lead to 
very different policy outcomes that diverge significantly from international conventions and 
guidelines. In this sense both Bolivia and Argentina are stories of extremes. Both countries 
take the norm seriously as well as their commitment to a rights-based agenda. And both 
countries move beyond a responsive model of compliance. Bolivia and Argentina are not 
ignoring human rights law, nor are they trying to avoid the costs of  ‘translation’. For Bolivia, 
there are political costs to pay in taking a deviant compliance approach because of the 
international condemnation that has followed. Argentina, meanwhile, has embarked on a 
costly eradication strategy, which requires investments in both the judiciary and the 
regulatory system. Ultimately, the evidence here speaks to the need for a more nuanced 
understanding of what compliance means and the recognition of domestic inputs in its 
formulation.  
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